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Tom Ginsburg*
INTRODUCTION

The field of law and development studies has come up with few big ideas.
Born out of 1960s optimism about the possibilities of law influencing social
change, the early law and development movement sought to export American
ideas, institutions, and educational methods to developing societies. But law
and development soon turned inward in frustration at the slow pace of change
and the resistance of elites in the developing world. Perhaps the most cited
article demonstrating the dissatisfaction and disappointment in the field is one
by Trubek and Galanter, which examines a litany of failed assumptions and
unmet promise.1
Yet the effort to export American institutions did not end with the demise
of the first law and development movement. Reflecting shifts in Washington's
* Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. Thanks to Linda Beale, Ravi Bhavnani, Clifford Clark, Kevin Davis, Rajmohan Gandhi,
Patrick Keenan, Richard McAdams, Andrew Orta, Daria Roithmayr, Jeffrey A. Wolf, and Michael
Vogel for helpful comments. Thanks to Maury Saiger and Jeffrey A. Wolf for research assistance.
1. David Trubek & Mark Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the
Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1062 (1975). This
article may have set the stage for the critical legal studies movement. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Law
and Development, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 470 (1995) (reviewing LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (Anthony
Carty ed., 1992); LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD (Sammy Adelman & Abdul Paliwala eds.,

1993). Critique remains the favored mode of law and society scholars who work in this area. See
generally Carol Rose, The "New" Law and Development Movement in the Post-Cold War Era: A
Vietnam Case Study, 32 LAW & Soc'v REV. 93 (1998); Bryant Garth, Law and Society as Law and
Development, 37 LAW & Soc' REv. 301 (2003); Bryant Garth, Building Strong And Independent
Judiciaries Through the New Law and Development: Behind the Paradoxof Consensus Programs
and Perpetually DisappointingResults, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 383 (2002); JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL
IMPERIALISM

(1979).
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policy, the late 1970s saw a focus primarily on human rights institutions, and the
1980s saw a move toward police training. In the 1990s, during the aftermath of
the Cold War, a massive new wave of law exporting activities began, promoted
by foundations, global economic institutions, and nongovernmental actors, along
with the development agencies of the United States and many other countries.
Much of this activity reflected a new consensus on how rich countries should
deal with poor ones, with law playing a central role. The "Washington Consensus," as it became known, held that exporting democratic governance, economic
liberalization and the rule of law would lead to a better world. Like the earlier
"law and development" movement, it assumed that institutions could be transferred to the developing world and that legal reform held the key to economic
growth. In contrast with the earlier efforts, however, it has maintained momentum for some time and appears to be in little danger of slowing.2
Against this backdrop, Professor Amy Chua has expounded a new "big
idea" in the arena of law and development. 3 Chua observes that the spread of
democracy and markets in the 1990s was accompanied by a surge in ethnic
instability and violence. The most visible cases were the breakup of Yugoslavia,
leading to genocides in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and the mid-decade
Rwanda genocide. In many other locales too, Chua notes, ethnic tensions are on
the rise. Instead of seeing genocide and ethnic tension as mere aberrations on
the modernist road to peace and prosperity, Chua connects the phenomenon to
the Washington Consensus and its failure to consider racial and ethnic factors.4
In particular, she calls attention to the phenomenon of market-dominant
minorities, ethnic groups that enjoy disproportionate success in entrepreneurship
and capital accumulation. From the Chinese in Indonesia, who constitute 3% of
the population but control 70% of non-land assets; to Jewish oligarchs in postSoviet Russia, who are six of the seven richest men in the country; to Lebanese
in Sierra Leone; to the Ibo in Nigeria, certain groups of ethnic minorities often
do disproportionately well in economic terms. 5 Given this general phenomenon,
democracy and economic liberalization may exacerbate ethnic tension. Ethnic
minorities with market skills, says Chua, are well positioned to benefit from free
market reforms, while democratization and political liberalization make it easier
for poorer majorities to express resentment against these groups. 6 The result is
ethnic demagoguery as political entrepreneurs compete for support by highlighting the gap in wealth between market dominant minorities and poorer majorities.
Globalization, she notes, has exacerbated the phenomenon: "democracy, rather
than reinforcing the market's efficiency and wealth producing effects, leads to
2. See, e.g., Center on International Cooperation, Reconstruction of Afghanistan, at http://
www.cic.nyu.edu/conflict/conflicttranslations.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2003); United States Institute for Peace, Establishing Justice and the Rule of Law in Iraq: A Blueprintfor Action (Aug. 1,
2003), at http://www.usip.orglevents/2003/0801lESIraq-law.html.
3. AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003).
4. Id. at 7.
5. Id. at 6.
6. Id. at 16.
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powerful ethnonationalist, anti-market pressures and routinely results in confiscation, instability, authoritarian backlash, and violence."7
Chua's powerful connections between democracy, development and ethnicity synthesize a massive amount of information into an elegant argument of
global scale. It is in many ways a lawyer's argument, accumulating vast evidence to build an apparently unimpeachable case. It also has the advantage of
simplicity, which means it is likely to sell in Washington, D.C. But is Chua
correct? The answer to this question requires careful consideration of the evidence, which in turn requires the use of the techniques of social science. This
essay suggests that, when examined more closely, the connections Chua draws
are not supported by the evidence. While her account, inspired by the experience of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, fits certain contexts, she extends the
argument further than the data warrants. Ultimately, there is less reason to be
pessimistic than Chua suggests, despite the continuing presence of ethnic
violence.
Part I of this review lays out Chua's argument about democracy, markets
and ethnicity. Part II evaluates whether her positive argument is consistent with
what social scientists have learned about these questions, and demonstrates that
her argument is incomplete in important ways. Part III focuses on Chua's normative conclusions. Even if Chua's positive analysis were accurate, her normative conclusions are wanting, and fail to account for the extensive role that
international actors can play in reducing the threat of ethnic conflict.
I.
THE ARGUMENT

Chua's book focuses on the phenomenon of market dominant minorities
that perform disproportionately well in economic activity. Market dominant minorities, Chua points out, exist in many societies. Perhaps the paradigm case is
the Chinese in Southeast Asia, whose minority status and economic success
have been treated as a problem in every nation in the region over the last century, with very different policy responses. 8 Jews, Indians, Lebanese, and many
other groups play similar roles in other societies. Market dominant minorities
often form networks that provide advantages in trading and other economically
7.
8.

Id.
See, e.g.,

ANTHONY REID & DANIEL CHIROT, ESSENTIAL OUTSIDERS

AND SETTLERS: HISTORIES OF SOUTHEAST

ASIA AND THE CHINESE

(1997);

SOJOURNERS

(Anthony Reid ed., 1996); UN-

GROUNDED EMPIRES: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF MODERN CHINESE TRANSNATIONALISM (Aihwa
Ong & Donald Nonini, eds., 1997); SOUTHEAST ASIAN CHINESE AND CHINA (Leo Suryadinata ed.,

1995); Stephen A. Douglas, PoliticalDynamics of the Diaspora: the Chinese in Southeast Asia, 5
ASIAN J. POL. Sci. 37 (1997); see also Farid Harianto, Business Linkages and Chinese Entrepreneurs
in

Southeast

Asia, in CULTURE & ECONOMY: THE SHAPING

OF CAPITALISM IN EASTERN ASIA

(Timothy Brook & Hy V. Luong eds., 1997); Pek Koon Heng, Robert Kuok and the Chinese Business Network in Eastern Asia: A Study in Sino-capitalism, in CULTURE & ECONOMY: THE SHAPING
OF CAPITALISM IN EASTERN ASIA (Timothy Brook & Hy V. Luong eds., 1997); THE CHINESE IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA (Linda Y.C. Lim & Peter Gosling eds., 1983).
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valuable activities. 9 Their advantages of in-group trust, developed through repeated transactions and the availability of reputational sanctions, along with
transnational networks, reduce their transaction costs of exchange.' This can
lead to phenomenal economic success in a variety of environments.
Market dominant minorities tend to be economically successful but politically weak, either because of their small numbers, immigrant status, or lack of
access to the technology of coercion represented by the state. Political weakness
makes them ideal coalition partners for autocratic rulers who can provide protection in exchange for economic support. Political marginalization may in turn
exacerbate the problem of economic inequality, as young talented minorities
invest resources in becoming better businessmen rather than bureaucrats, politicians or soldiers. Meanwhile, opportunities for members of the majority who
lack market skills are more constrained, and may lead them to join the military
or state apparatus.
The 1990s shift toward political and economic liberalization, Chua argues,
exacerbated the tensions between market dominant minorities and relatively
poorer majorities." The argument is straightforward. Liberalization provides
even greater advantages to those who already have market skills: the politically
disfavored minority, who then become even richer relative to the poorer majority. Democratization creates political competition for the votes of the majority-providing opportunities for demagogues to exploit resentment against the
market dominant minority. The result is backlash.
Chua identifies three forms of backlash. First, backlash may be directed at
economic liberalization, as voters elect anti-market populists who favor redistribution. Second, there may be backlash directed at democracy, as members of
the economically dominant minority form coalitions with autocrats and limit
majority participation. Third, and most troubling, there may be backlash directed at the minorities themselves, in the form of ethnic violence and racial
targeting.
Chua illustrates the backlash against economic liberalization with the case
of Zimbabwe, where President Robert Mugabe has in recent years increased his
anti-white rhetoric and encouraged confiscations by non-governmental invaders. ' 2 Another example is the phenomenon of Hugo Chavez, the former paratrooper who has targeted the assets of Venezuela's oil elites and large
landowners. As Chua notes, nationalizations have occurred 13in many countries,
and often target ethnic minorities who are politically weak.
9.
See JANET TAI LANDA, TRUST, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY: BEYOND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF ETHNIC TRADING NETWORKS, CONTRACT LAW, AND GIFT-EXCHANGE (1994).

10. For an analysis of the factors that might account for market-dominant minorities, see Kevin Davis, Michael Trebilcock & Bradley Heys, Ethnically Homogenous Elites in Developing Countries, 32 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L BUSINESS 331 (2001).
11.
CHUA, supra note 3, at 8-10.
12. Id. at 127-130. Mugabe could be used to illustrate all three forms of backlash.
13. Id. at 130-31. Chua could also have highlighted how foreign investors, also frequently
targeted by populist anti-market politicians, enjoy far greater protection than local market dominant
minorities because of international standards that require full compensation for expropriated property. See, e.g., European Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, art. 13, 34 I.L.M. 360 (1995) (re-
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The backlash against democracy is illustrated by Sierra Leone, where an
ethnic minority, the Lebanese, had long dominated the country's economy. In
the early 1970s, President Siaka Stevens declared a state of emergency and promoted the business interests of a small handful of Lebanese cronies, who controlled the country's lucrative diamond trade. This alliance allowed Stevens to
finance his patronage network while protecting the Lebanese from threat. The
backlash against democracy is also well illustrated with President Mohamed
Suharto's Indonesia, where Suharto protected the Chinese minority from the
worst excesses of violent social movements, while relying on Chinese capital to
fund pet projects and set up his own family in business. Autocracy and crony
capitalism
go hand-in-hand, and often have an ethnic underpinning, according to
4
Chua.1
The third backlash, against the minorities themselves, is illustrated by Serbia and Rwanda. Typically the process involves anti-minority demagoguery,
whose proponents want not only the wealth of the minorities but the ethnic
cleansing of the country. For example, in the aftermath of the breakup of the5
Soviet Union, Russians were expelled from the various non-Russian republics.'
More prominently, the authors of the Rwandan genocide
exhorted their follow16
ers to cleanse the country of Tutsi "cockroaches."'
As these examples show, the various forms of backlash can be overlapping.
When Mugabe targets white farms, he instigates a backlash not only against
economic openness but also against white farmers. Attempts to banish the ethnic Russian population from, say, Lithuania, may be simultaneously anti-Russian and anti-democratic. Furthermore, these backlashes are typically
ineffective in achieving their goals. The minorities who suffer from backlash
are typically from the lower and middle classes, not members of the upper class.
And rather than empowering and enriching poor majorities, backlash tends to
undermine the economy and democracy at the same time.
One of Chua's great strengths is her ability to explain an amazing amount
of disparate phenomena with this simple dynamic. This book is global in scope,
and challenges much conventional wisdom. For example, Latin America is
often thought of as a region without ethnicity in the sense that it exists in Europe
or Asia. But in many countries in Latin America, a light skinned elite of European descendant dominates a poorer majority of Native or Amerindian descent.
Chua points out that charismatic demagogues are increasingly exploiting Native
quiring compensation at fair market value); North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992,
art. 1110, cl.2, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 605, 641 (1993); see also Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais,
The Global Fifth Amendment? Nafta's Investment Protections and the Misguided Questfor an International "Regulatory Takings" Doctrine, 78 NYU L. REV. 30, 32-41 (2003).
14. CHUA, supra note 3, at 151-53.
15. Id. at 164.
16. Amended Indictment, The Prosecutorv. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR 97-19,
M 5.10-5.13, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, April 13, 2000, available at 2000 WL
33951198 (citing radio broadcasts describing Tutsis as inyenzi or cockroaches); see also BILL
BERKELEY, THE GRAVES ARE NOT YET FULL: RACE, TRIBE AND POWER IN THE HEART OF AFRICA
(2001); PHiLIP GOUrREvrrcH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WrrH
OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA (1999).
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Indian identity to claim political power, a phenomenon that she ties to economic
globalization. 17 We thus see the phenomena of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela,
Alejandro Toledo in Peru, the nascent black consciousness movement of Brazil,
and a rising Native Indian movement in Ecuador.
In another innovative argument, Chua argues that one of the causes of the
Middle East conflict may be relative economic underperformance. 18 Israel's
success in a region of economic stagnation, she asserts, may render Israel to the
Arab world what the Chinese are in the Philippines: an aloof, wealthy class that
is viewed as failing to participate in the community and thus engenders
backlash.
Finally, Chua extends her analysis to incorporate the new global ideology
of anti-Americanism. 19 In a global sense, America, though ethnically diverse
and open in identity, is a market-dominant minority. America is to the world as
minority ethnic elites are to poor majorities in many countries: a small, conspicuously wealthy minority, believed to pay insufficient attention to the poor majority and structuring the rules of the game for our own self-interest. The result:
backlash against markets, democracy and Americans, who continue to be the
leading target of terrorist violence around the world.20 Chua's world looks grim
indeed.
II.
THE EVIDENCE

Chua's approach to evidence is primarily anecdotal. Rather than use social
science methodologies, she accumulates individual examples of ethnic conflict
from virtually every region of the globe to support her thesis. This section develops two related critiques. First, Chua defines key terms so broadly as to make
virtually any instance of ethnic conflict fit her paradigm. Second, her argument
depends on a causal claim that she does not adequately establish. Once we examine the social science research, the story appears, as one might guess, much
more complicated.
A.

Definitions

Chua's key terms are not always adequately defined. She adopts a pragmatic approach, defining markets and democratization as the kind of economic
and political reforms "actually being implemented today outside the West."''z
This pragmatism ought to lead to caution with regard to both the positive analy17. CHUA, supra note 3, at 50.
18. id. at 211-27.
19. Id. at 229-58.
20. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 (Apr. 2003), at http://www.
state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/.
21. CHUA, supra note 3, at 14 (emphasis in original). It is worth noting that the most visible
genocides of the 1990s, in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, were not preceded by major democracy programs supported by foreigners.
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sis and normative conclusions. 22 Democracy and market reforms are not uniform phenomena. Not every instance of a democratizing reform should be
condemned simply because some such reforms, in some places, have led some
politicians to engage in ethnic demagoguery. Similarly, the particular institutional design and structure of markets may make all the difference. Most economists think markets are generally beneficial, but few these days would contest
the assertion that institutional structures vary in important ways in different markets, and that this has serious consequences for both growth and distribution,
which in turn are likely to affect the probability of ethnic tension.
Without crisp definitions of Chua's key terms, it is difficult to assess
whether Chua is indeed correct. Chua can and does include a wide array of
phenomena that may or may not fit her terms, making her causal claim appear
more plausible. I take each of her key terms in turn.
1. Democracy
Democracy in particular is a complicated phenomenon capable of multiple
definitions and conceptions. Some view democracy as procedural in essence,
involving free and fair elections that determine who is to govern, and no more.23
Others view democracy as institutional, involving a set of particular structures
with particular functions, such as a parliament, courts, and a free media; this
view is implicitly assumed by many development agencies.24 Theorists tend to
favor a more substantive conception of democracy that incorporates specific
rights or focuses on substantive levels of participation by the citizenry, regardless of formal structures.2 5
Chua's normative suggestion, developed briefly in the end of the book, that
constitutionalism is a partial palliative, reveals her assumption that democracy is
electoral; that is, rule by majority. 26 This narrow characterization has been challenged on normative grounds by theorists and by empirical scholars who have
pointed out the potential for illiberal outcomes that it raises. 27 More importantly
for her normative claim, very few policymakers involved in "promoting democracy" abroad rely on such a thin conception of democracy, and most efforts to
export democracy involve an extensive set of institutional reforms, including an
open media, civil society, and constitutionalism. Independent courts are consid22.

Chua's primary purpose is positive, not normative. However, she does not altogether

avoid advancing normative recommendations.
23. This view is associated with JOSEPH

SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM SOCIALISM AND DEMOC-

RACY (1942). See also Brad Roth, Evaluating Democratic Governance, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gregory Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000); Molly Beutz, Functional
Democracy: Responding to Failuresof Accountability, 44 HARV. INT'L L. J. 387, 396-401 (2003)

(discussing differing conceptions of democracy).
24. THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABOARD: THE LEARNING CURVE (1999).
25. See Roth, supra note 23.
26. CHUA, supra note 3, at 14 (democratization is "immediate elections with universal
suffrage").
27. See, e.g., FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OP FREEDOM (2003); GUILLERMO O'DONNELL,
THE UNRULE OF LAW (1999); Samuel Huntington, After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third
Wave, 8 J. DEMOCRACY 3, 10 (1997); Larry Diamond, Is the Third Wave Over?, 7 J. DEMOCRACY 20

(1997).
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ered to be essential to democracy because of their large role in protecting minority rights. 28 Mere electoral democracy is increasingly a straw man, and not a
faithful representative of democratization "actually being implemented today
outside the West." It is noteworthy that Chua does not identify strong connections between actual programs to promote democracy by foreign actors and the
ethnic violence on which she focuses.
In any case, by failing to explicitly choose a definition of democracy, Chua
has the advantage of being able to attribute many things to democracy that may
have little to do with it. Her analysis of the Rwanda conflict is perhaps the most
obvious example of this tendency. 29 As the largest scale genocide of the 1990s,
Rwanda would seem to be a central case for her thesis to explain. Few would
consider Rwanda circa 1993 a democracy. Although an internationally brokered
power-sharing agreement calling for democracy was proposed in Arusha in
1993, incitement by the ethnic Hutu government had begun several years earlier.3° Chua acknowledges the difficulties: many people, she notes, "insist that
the horrors of Rwanda had nothing to do with democracy . . . .But the fact
remains that a majority of the Rwandan people supported, indeed personally
3
conducted, the unspeakable atrocities committed in 1994.", 1 The fact that a
majority of a population commits an atrocity, or is complicit with it, hardly
renders that action a result of democracy. 32 By defining democracy as anything
supported by a majority, Chua renders her argument tautological. Any violence
perpetrated by a majority against a minority becomes in some sense "democratically" sanctioned. Adolf Hitler-who after all, assumed power through democratic channels-becomes a democratic leader. With this definition, we should
not then be surprised when "democracy" appears to cause ethnic violence
against minorities.
Similarly, to say that Robert Mugabe's regime and its targeting of property
33
While
of the market-dominant white majority is "democratic" seems a reach.
in some sense the return of Zimbabwe to its indigenous majority in 1979 was a
democratic moment, Mugabe has always been a demagogue. His troops killed
between 6,000 and 20,000 civilians in Matabeland in 1983, long before the current round of anti-white rhetoric and confiscations.34 As time went on, Mugabe
consolidated power, forcing constitutional reforms and eliminating rivals. Partially in response to growing international pressure leading up to elections in
2002, Mugabe resorted to further demagoguery and began his targeting of white
farms. Mugabe's electoral fraud in 2002 was widely reported, and it is likely
28. CAROTHERS, supra note 24, at 163-79.
29.
30.
31.
32.

CHUA, supra note 3, at 170.
1.5, 1.14.
See Amended Indictment, supra note 10, at
CHUA, supra note 3, at 170.
See On a Patch of Grass, ECONOMIST, May 18, 2003 (describing Rwanda's gacaca pro-

cess); see also DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING ExEcUTIONERS (1996).

CHUA, supra note 3, at 11.
34. Norma J. Kriger, Robert Mugabe, Another Too-Long-Serving African Ruler: A Review
Essay, 118 POL. ScI. Q. 307, 308 (2003).
33.
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35
that a free and fair democratic election would have produced a different result.
Zimbabwe is a place where democracy is clearly part of the solution, not part of
the problem.
In short, there are problems with Chua's characterization of democracy.
Her pragmatic definition is so broad as to include virtually any majoritarian
phenomenon. Since any violence perpetrated by a majority against a marketdominant minority is by definition majoritarian, it is hardly surprising that she
finds a link between democracy and ethnic violence. The risk is that policymakers, buoyed by her exhortation to "understand" ethnic dynamics, will refrain
from the sustained international engagement that may be necessary for democratic institutions to thrive.

2.

Markets

Similarly, "markets" covers a broad range of phenomena. Here, Chua focuses on the neo-liberal model of privatization and free-market capitalism that is
increasingly coming under scrutiny in the development community.36 In her
analysis of specific cases, however, Chua moves away from the neo-liberal view
to include such disparate market phenomena as Suharto's crony capitalism, 37 the
Russian klepto-privatization of the mid-1990s, 38 and Israel's economy as a
whole. 39 But the extent to which these societies have liberalized varies. The
Russian privatization fits her paradigm well, and was undertaken under the guidance of the IMF and economists such as Jeffrey Sachs. But few economists
would describe Suharto's Indonesia as a free market system. Similarly, for
much of its history, Israel was a socialist state, and even today has very limited
private ownership of land. This hardly follows IMF dictates.
Chua also asserts that the government of Myanmar is "aggressively promarket.'
While the SLORC government may have abandoned General Ne
Win's "Burmese road to socialism," (a program that had impoverished what had
been considered one of the most promising economies in the developing world),
the utter corruption of today's Myanmar regime bears slight resemblance to
what a free market would look like. Here, Chua's pragmatic definition saves
her. Relative to pre-1988 Burma, Myanmar has indeed become more marketized. That it bears little resemblance to an idealized free market, and looks
much more like a narco-military regime, is not Chua's problem. But it does
35. Chua argues that the election fraud was not more extensive than other elections the West
has certified as free and fair. CHIUA, supra note 3, at 129. But that hardly means the election was
free and fair.
36. See, e.g., JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS Disco,rrsENrs (2002).
37. CHUA, supra note 3, at 43-45.
38. Id. at 82-86.
39. Id. at 211-222.
40. Israel's early 1990s shift toward economic liberalization did not result in any appreciable
increase in Arab anti-Israeli sentiment, which has been a sad fact of life for the entire history of the
state and has, as Chua acknowledges, multiple and complex causes. CHUA, supra note 3, at 212; see
also NORMAN STILLMAN, THE JEWS OF ARAB LANDS (1979); BENNY MORRIS, RIGHTEOUS VICTIMS:
A HISTORY OF THE ZIONIST-ARAB CONFLICT 1881-1998 (1999).

41.

CHUA, supra note 3, at 24.
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implicate the normative conclusions to be drawn: it is at least plausible that the
solution for such countries is not less marketization but more. It is arguable that
liberalization will decrease the returns of crony capitalists. By allowing in new
market participants, including foreign investors, liberalization might actually
level the domestic playing field.4 2 The point is that an economist would hardly
lump all these phenomena together. If "markets" can be used to describe any
economic policy pursued outside of Cuba or North Korea, then it is not surprising to find a link between markets and any political or social outcome in the last
twenty years including ethnic tension. But correlation and causation are
different.
There are strong empirical and theoretical reasons to think that the precise
manner of liberalization is of greater consequence than the fact of liberalization,
which Chua finds to be nearly universal. A short term big bang program, as was
implemented in post-1991 Russia, seems likely to produce rising unemployment
and inequality, as well as the minority dominance that Chua identifies. The big
bang was far more socially disruptive than a gradualist reform program such as
has been undertaken in China the last two decades.43 However, Chua's broad
definition of markets treats both approaches as identical, though the details of
these policy choices are likely to be what matter.
The Malaysian case illustrates the different types of market institutions and
the way that, under certain circumstances, economic liberalization can reduce
ethnic tension. In Malaysia, ethnic identity is an explicit basis of politics, but
the state has channeled formerly violent political conflict into peaceful channels,
in part through majoritarian affirmative action programs in the form of the New
Economic Policy. 44 Malaysia has done this while maintaining a relatively liberal economic environment, open to foreign investment and at least as "marketoriented" as Burma's. The rising wealth and careful management of ethnic factors in a society that suffered massive violence only a generation ago shows that
economic development can proceed while ethnic violence is reduced. 45 Malaysia has done so while remaining a semi-democracy, retaining electoral
institutions. 46
42. See Quan Li & Adam Resnick, Reversal of Fortunes: DemocraticInstitutions and Foreign
Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries, 57 INT'L ORG. 175 (2003).
43. Chua notes that China has liberalized politically at the same time it has introduced market
reforms. See CHUA, supra note 3, at 175. However, because China has no market-dominant minority, it does not implicate Chua's argument.
44. Id. at 271.
45. Deepa Khosla, Chinese in Malaysia: Balancing Communal Inequalities, in PEOPLES VERSUS STATES: MINORITIES AT RISK IN THE NEW CENTURY

133-37 (Ted Robert Gurr ed., 2000); Ma-

laysia is also noteworthy for resisting the IMF's suggested approach during the Asian Economic
crisis of 1997-98. Whereas the IMF recommended austerity programs that tended to hurt the lower
class, Malaysia implemented a program of capital controls that insulated it from the painful recessions experienced by other countries in the region. ST1GLITZ, supra note 36, at 122-25. Chua discounts the transferability of the Malaysian model. See CHUA, supra note 3, at 272.
46. While there is plenty to criticize in Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's long rule, Malaysia would certainly pass Chua's definition of democracy if Rwanda in 1993 did. Compare supra text
accompanying note 32.
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Ethnicity

"Ethnicity" is also a complicated and multi-faceted phenomenon. Chua
recognizes that ethnicity is both socially constructed (hence malleable) and perceived as real (hence relatively intractable). Societies that appear to us to be
homogenous could, given alternative historical trajectories, have become
ethnicized rather easily. It is also important to remember that in much of the
world, colonialism created and exacerbated ethnic tensions where none had existed. The Hutu-Tutsi conflict, for example, arose with Belgian colonial racializing, rigidifying groups that were previously fluid.4 7
When Chua turns to the specific phenomenon of ethnic violence, however,
she offers no definition. Ethnic tension and ethnic violence are different
things.48 Chua often seems to be focusing on ethnic tension or grievance, but at
other times shifts her focus to actual violence. But not every instance of ethnic
tension leads to ethnic violence, defined as "violence perpetrated across ethnic
lines, in which at least one party is not a state (or representative of a state), and
in which the putative ethnic difference is integral rather than incidental to that
violence." 49 Since the degree of "ethnic" contribution to the violence is hardly
self-defining, "ethnic" violence is not intrinsic to the act but a matter of later
characterization. 5 ° One must therefore use caution in characterizing the motive
to violence as ethnic. Even within the category of violence, there are vast qualitative differences between mass genocides such as those in Rwanda, episodic
deadly ethnic riots, and violent protests, to name but three of the myriad forms
ethnic violence can take. 5 1 We ought to "identify, analyze and explain the heterogeneous processes and mechanisms involved in generating the varied instances of what we all too casually lump together-given our prevailing
52
ethnicizing interpretative frames-as 'ethnic violence.' ,
As with democracy and markets, Chua's definitions do not adequately permit precise empirical evaluation. An example is her treatment of Thailand. As
with other countries in Southeast Asia, the Chinese form a market-dominant
minority there. Unlike other countries in the region, the ethnic distinction between Thai and Chinese is not emphasized and, indeed, suppressed. Chua points
out, accurately, that this reflects coercion by the pre-democratic Thai state earlier in the twentieth century, as though this supports her argument.53 But the
47. CHUA, supra note 3, at 15; see also John R. Bowen, The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict, 7
J. DEMOCRACY 3, 4 (1996); Yash Ghai, Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for Analysis, in
AUTONOMY AND ETHNICITY: NEGOTIATING COMPETING CLAIMS IN MULTI-ETHNIC STATES (Yash

Ghai ed., 2000).
48. Robin M. Williams, The Sociology of Ethnic Conflicts: Comparative International Perspectives, 20 ANN. REV. Soc. 49, 54 (1994).
49. Rogers Brubaker & David D. Laitin, Ethnic and Nationalist Violence, 24 ANN. REV.
SOCIOL. 423, 428 (1998).
50. Id. at 445.
51.

DONALD HOROwrrz, THE DEADLY ETHNIC RIOT 1, 19 (2001).

52. Brubaker & Laitin, supra note 49, at 447; see also Bowen, supra note 47, at 3 (ethnic
conflict has "become a shorthand way to speak about any and all violent confrontations between
groups of people living in the same country").
53. CHUA, supra note 3, at 180.
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more central fact about Thailand is the simultaneous introduction of democracy
and economic reform since the adoption of a new constitution in 1997. 5 4 This
has been accompanied by the emergence of a new Thai identity that emphasizes
not ethnic origin but citizenship and service to the Thai nation, effectively reducing the barrier between Sino-Thai and Thai to zero.
If Chua were correct,
we should have seen a backlash of some kind, yet none has emerged. Markets
and democracy facilitated ethnic integration, whereas autocracy in previous periods exacerbated it.
Another definitional lacuna is "market dominant minority." The position
of immigrant groups such as Chinese in Southeast Asia and Lebanese in Sierra
Leone may not be analogous to colonial remnants such as whites in Zimbabwe.
The immigrant groups are certainly not analogous to many of the groups in
Africa that she identifies as market dominant minorities. The Ebe in Togo and
Bamileke in Cameroon came by their "dominance" through geography, because
they inhabit areas near trade routes. 5 6 The Kikuyu in Kenya may perform well
economically, but are a plurality of the population and hence less likely to be the
target of backlash than the Chinese in Indonesia, for instance. The particular
historical reasons behind market dominance may include geography, colonialism, and many other factors of critical importance that ought to make a difference for outcomes.
Despite these definitional lapses, Chua's framework does provide food for
thought, especially when extending beyond market dominant minorities. For
example, global anti-Americanism may in fact contain a component of economic resentment, though the more visible and obvious sources are directed
against specific policies and framed as such. But whereas most market dominant minorities are politically weak, America is hegemonic. This means the
predicted backlash is not likely to be against markets, but a "backlash against
democracy" at the global level. American resistance to international institutions
that reflect the will of the majority of states, such as the UN General Assembly
and more recently the International Criminal Court, illustrates the reluctance of a
market-dominant minority to be governed by rules established by a majority of
the "community of nations." Furthermore, American inconsistencies on issues
of free trade-utilizing free market rhetoric while retaining tariffs for politically
important sectors such as agriculture and steel-does little to advance our image
abroad and fosters a backlash against both markets and democracy.
The Middle East story is more complicated, as Chua acknowledges, and
may not fit the paradigm as easily. The origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict are
intensely contested, but few have argued that relative wealth is a primary cause.
Indeed, anti-Israel sentiment seems to be greater in wealthy countries like Saudi
Arabia than in the poor countries of Egypt and Jordan. Although relative wealth
54. Pinai Nanakorn, Re-making of the Constitution in Thailand, 6 SING. J. INT'L COMP. L. 90
(2002).
55. William A. Callahan, Beyond Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism, DiasporicChinese and
Neo-Nationalism in China and Thailand, 57 INT'L ORG. 481 (2003).
56. Thanks to Patrick Keenan for this point and helpful discussions on Africa.
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may be one of many factors in the conflict, it is awkward to characterize Israel
as a regional market-dominant minority when most of its neighbors refuse to
trade with it and thus do not participate in the same market. Nevertheless, one
wonders if Arab economies would be in the same poor state they are in today
had they not discriminated against, expropriated, and in many cases expelled,
their Jewish minorities, an underappreciated part of the story surrounding the
establishment of Israel.57
In short, Chua's use of anecdotal evidence provides a powerful argument of
global scope integrating many diverse phenomena. It is a stimulating line of
reasoning, and my sense is that it fits some Southeast Asian contexts well
(though not others as my discussion of Thailand indicated). However, to establish causality, more careful definitions are needed. There are strong theoretical
reasons to think that democracy and markets, properly defined and realized, can
reduce ethnic conflict: democracy can channel conflict from the bullet to the
ballot box, while markets can remove unfair advantages of crony capitalism. If
causal linkages are to be established, an anecdotal approach to evidence cannot
be dispositive. To untangle whether Chua's theories describing the relationship
among markets, democracy, and ethnic violence have greater explanatory
power, a more social scientific approach is needed.
B.

Causality: What Does the Data Say?

Chua's suggestion is that democracy + markets = ethnic hatred. This equation implies causality. While in a number of places, Chua seems to qualify this
thesis to make the weaker claim that free market democracy merely contributes
to ethnic tension, the causal claim is announced on the book's cover in the subtitle: "free market democracy breeds ethnic hatred and global instability." Elsewhere, Chua states that markets and democracy are a "principal, aggravating
cause of group hatred and ethnic violence."'58 The policy recommendations also
suggest a fairly strong causal claim. If the mix of democratization and market
reform does not play a major role in producing ethnic violence, there is not
much purpose for the book.
The literature on the frequency and causes of ethnic violence and ethnic
conflict is vast and engages Chua's argument at several points. This section
focuses on two questions: Is the resurgence of ethnic violence real? And if so,
what role, if any, do democracy and economic liberalization play in causing it?
1. More Ethnic Conflict?
The first empirical issue is whether the perceived increase in ethnic violence in the 1990s is in fact a real resurgence, or whether it is a misperception
based on a small number of high-profile events exacerbated by the growing
power of the media. As Brubaker and Laitin point out, much literature characterizes the world as "a seething cauldron on the verge of boiling over or as a
57.
58.

MoRs, supra note 40; see also
CHUA, supra note 3, at 9.

STILLMAN,

supra note 40.

20041

DEMOCRACY, MARKETS AND DOOMSAYING

tinderbox, which a single careless spark could ignite into an inferno of ethnonationalist violence." 59 But in fact, "actual instances of ethnic and nationalist
politics, not vioviolence remain rare." 60 Ordinary symbolic and organizational
61
lence, are the most common form of ethnic political action.
It is also clear that ethnic violence is not unique to the 1990s, but has been
steadily increasing since the 1950s.6 2 One need only recall the mass murders of
the 1970s-by the Pakistani military in Bangladesh, by Idi Amin in Uganda, by
the Indonesian army in East Timor, and by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, 63 to
take only a few prominent examples-to realize that ethnic and political mass
murder are hardly unique to an era of exporting markets and democracy.
One of the analytic problems in determining whether there has in fact been
an increase in ethnic violence is that violence is hardly self-defining. People
kill, rape and loot; later, other people, far removed, look at these acts and attribute a motivation in order to understand the violence. We know that violence
indeed surged in the early 1990s, but this may have been in part because conflicts over resources that had previously been thought of in Cold War terms were
now labeled "ethnic" by their perpetrators or by outside analysts.6 4
Ted Gurr, a leading scholar of ethnic conflict, has developed a data set that
tracks ethnic conflict over time. 65 He has tracked an increasing number of conflicts since the 1970s. Early in the 1990s, Gurr noted that there was an increase
in ethnic conflict corresponding with the third wave of democratization. 66 After
1994, the number of new ethnic conflicts has apparently declined, along with the
intensity of existing conflicts. 6 7 In a recent overview, Gurr found that both eth59. Brubaker & Laitin, supra note 49, at 424; see also Bowen, supra note 47, at 4.
60. Brubaker & Laitin, supra note 49, at 424.
61. TED ROBERT GURR, Long War, Short Peace: The Rise of Ethnopolitical Conflict at the End
of the Cold War, in PEOPLES VERSUS STATES, supra note 45, at 27 (2000); David Lake & Donald
Rothchild, Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Conflict, in THE INTERNATIONAL
SPREAD OF ETHNIC CONFLICT 1, 7 (David Lake & Donald Rothchild eds., 1998) (noting that most
groups pursue interests peacefully); BERKELEY, supra note 16, at 35 (explaining that ethnic conflict
is rare in Africa).
62. GURR, The Ethnic Basis For PoliticalAction of the 1980s and 1990s, in PEOPLES VERSUS
STATES, supra note 45, at 3.

63.

The ethnic component of the Khmer Rouge's autogenocide is emphasized in BEN

KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME: RACE, POWER AND GENOCIDE UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE, 1975-79

(2002).
64. Brubaker & Laitin, supra note 49; see also Saul Newman, Does Modernization Breed
Ethnic Political Conflict, 43 WORLD POL. 451, 451 (1991) ("[S]ince the early 1960s there have been
many manifestations of ethnic political conflict in both industrialized and developing states."). See
generally Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Ontology of "Political Violence": Action and Identity in Civil
Wars, 1 PERSP. ON POL. 475 (2003).
65. The Minorities at Risk Project, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, at http://www.minoritiesatrisk.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2003).
66. TED ROBERT GURR, MINORITIES AT RISK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICTS
89-93 (1993). But see TED ROBERT GURR, Long War, Short Peace, supra note 61, at 49 (2000)
(arguing that most 1990s conflicts in Africa had little or nothing to do with democratization).
67. TED ROBERT GURR, Preface, in PEOPLES VERSUS STATES, supra note 45, at xiii (2000)
("Comparative evidence shows that the intensity of ethnopolitical conflict subsided in most world
regions from the mid- through late-1990s and that relatively few new [conflicts] have emerged since

the early 1990s"); see also Stephen M. Saideman et al., Democratization, PoliticalInstitutions,and
Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time Series Analysis 1985-1998, 35 CoMP. POL. STUD. 103, 103-4 (2002).
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nic and political violence have significantly declined in all regions of the world
since 1990.68
Similarly, looking solely at the phenomenon of civil war, James Fearon and
David Laitin note that the exacerbation of civil wars after the end of the Cold
War reflected long-term trends rather than a sudden phenomenon caused by ethnic factors. 6 9 They also find that controlling for per capita income, there was no
relationship between ethnic or religious diversity and civil war. Indeed, for poor
countries, civil war is likelier in more homogenous countries. 70 These studies
suggest that there may have been a surge in violence in the early 1990s, but that
the role of ethnicity in producing this surge is not as clear as some suggest.
These findings alone should give us pause before adopting policies based
on Chua's series of anecdotes. The global sweep of her argument suggests a
certain universality, but it is important to remember that perceptions of massive
and increasing ethnic conflict are not accurate. We can not evaluate the net
effect of democracy and markets without taking the actual levels of conflict into
account. Even if one proceeds anecdotally, counter-examples abound. Like the
dogs that did not bark, we do not tend to focus on the potential ethnic conflicts
that have not occurred. Muslims in Bulgaria have lived in peace with their
neighbors and received no international attention while Muslims in neighboring
Bosnia suffered genocide. Chinese in Mongolia, a much-feared market-dominant minority who were expelled under communism, have become more tolerated in the years since the fall of communism.
The condition of Lebanese throughout Latin America also provides an interesting example. Chua spends much time describing rising ethnic consciousness among indigenous populations in Latin America, and notes that old-line
white wealth co-exists with newer immigrant groups that have succeeded phenomenally.7 1 She mentions the Lebanese minority, whose market success has
been accompanied by political influence, as Argentina, Guatemala, and Ecuador
have all had presidents of Lebanese descent.7 2 Nowhere does Chua cite, nor am
I aware of, an incidence of mass violence perpetrated against Lebanese in the
entire region. Lebanese in these nations have continued to exert significant political influence, despite frequent political transition, instability and regime
change, including periods of both democratization and authoritarianism, and
waves of neo-liberal reform.
Another example of "missing" ethnic conflict is South Africa. This is an
important case for Chua to explain, for it seems to offer ideal conditions for one
of her backlashes. South Africa under apartheid was a paradigm case of a mar68. TED ROBERT GURR & MoNY MARSHALL, PEACE AND CoNFLcr 2003 (2003), available at
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/pc03print.pdf.
69. James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War, 97 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 75, 75 (2003) ("It appears not to be true that a greater degree of ethnic or religious
diversity ... by itself makes a country more prone to civil war.") (emphasis in original).
70. Id. at 82.
71. CHUA, supra note 3, at 61-63, 66-68.
72. Id. at 66-67. Lebanese Presidents have been elected in Guatemala (Ellias Serrano), Argentina (Carlos Menem), Ecuador (Jamil Mahuad Bucaram) and Mexico (Platurco Elias Calles, supposedly partly or half Lebanese).
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ket dominant white minority that held onto power by brutally suppressing democracy. In the early 1990s, South Africa introduced democracy while
following the lead of international financial institutions that promoted neoliberal
reforms. But the backlashes have not occurred, despite overwhelming pressures
caused by rising social demands. There have been no large-scale expropriations.
Furthermore, there has been no backlash against democracy or wide-scale violence against the white minority, perhaps because democracy has not actually
threatened white wealth in substantial ways.73 Chua's evidence of a portent of
future expropriation consists of a single rally of 5,000 people in 2001.74 Only
by conflating ethnic tension (a relatively common phenomenon) with ethnic violence (a relatively rare one) can Chua consider South Africa anything but counterevidence to her thesis. Certainly, South Africa has plenty of problems and
continuing massive inequalities that must be addressed.75 However, at some
level it also offers hope to us all that racial and economic justice, still far from
realized there, can be achieved through peaceful means.76
In addition to an absence of ethnic conflict where Chua's argument would
predict its existence, there are instances of ethnic conflict about which Chua's
argument is silent. Much of the violence in the 1990s was not particularly ethnic in character. The Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas has been primarily about
jobs and land rather than ethnic or cultural identity, and its leader, Subcommandante Marcos, is from northern Mexico.77 Indeed, very few of Latin
America's violent civil wars have had any ethnic component.7 8 Some of the
ethnic wars of the post-Soviet republics have involved ethnicity as populations
reshuffled around new borders, but others have involved no ethnic component
whatsoever. 79 Other "ethnic conflicts" are actually about other issues only tangentially related to ethnicity: the Ibo-Hausa conflicts in Nigeria, for example,
may reflect broader Muslim-Christian tensions.
The ongoing wars in the shadow of disintegrating states in West Africa
have some ethnic component, but many of the relevant military divisions are
armies and militias organized on national, not strictly ethnic, lines. 80 Many of
these conflicts are about property rights in commodities and the struggle over
73. But see S. Africa Police Find Bombs in Rightwing Plot Probe, AFRICA NEWS, Nov. 20,
2002, available at http://www.namibian.com.na/2002/November/africa/02989A2DAB.html (reporting a white right-wing bomb plot).
74. CHUA, supra note 3, at 130.
75. See, e.g., Faranak Miraftab, The Perilsof ParticipatoryDiscourse: Housing Policy in PostapartheidSouth Africa, 22 J. PLAN. ED. & RES. 226 (2003); JAMES L. GIBSON & AMANDA GOUWS,
OVERCOMINO INTOLERANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA: EXPERIMENTS IN DEMOCRATIC PERSUASION (2003).
76. I do not deny the possibility that widespread violence may occur in the future. My point is
simply that during the period where Chua's thesis would have predicted a backlash, the simultaneous
introduction of democracy and neo-liberal policies, no backlash occurred.
77. Bowen, supra note 47, at 10.
78. Stathis Kalyvas, "New" and "Old" Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?, 54 WORLD POLITICS
99, 115 (2001).
79. For example, the establishment of the so-called Dniestr Moldovan Republic in the middle
of Moldova was prompted by Moldovan nationalism, but was led by multiethnic leadership that
wished to maintain economic ties to Russia.
80. West Africa's Wars, ECONOMIST, July 5, 2003, at 22-24 (mentioning among such groups
the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy).
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valuable resources like diamonds. 8 1 According to one author, "The extent of
primary commodity exports is the largest single influence on the risk of conflict."'82 Some of these conflicts may of course have an ethnic dimension. But
to characterize the current wars there as ethnic struggles would be to miss the
most important parts of the story, such as the collapse of states and the economic
competition that fuels the conflicts. 8 3 Interestingly, globalization of markets
may fuel these conflicts in the sense that lowered transaction costs increase the
value of diamonds and other resources. This is not Chua's argument, however.
Her argument-that market-dominant minorities will be targeted by demagogues after political liberalization-hardly begins to account for the violence in
Sierra Leone, which has not been directed against the Lebanese minority. West
Africa is clearly a stretch for her causal claims.
In short, it is not clear that the 1990s have, in aggregate, witnessed more
ethnic conflict and violence than other periods. The best evidence seems to be
that the early 1990s did see such an expansion, which declined gradually during
the end of the decade. The perception of an ethnic cauldron has been exacerbated by a few high profile genocides and the tendency of observers to characterize many conflicts as "ethnic" when they may in fact have other causes.8 4
The fact of declining conflict should lead to caution about adopting policies for
tomorrow based on yesterday's dynamics.
2.

What Caused the Conflicts?

Even if conflict was not as common as many perceived, Chua might
counter with the weak version of her hypothesis: she is not arguing that ethnic
conflict is inevitable, only that it will be exacerbated by the twin exports of
economic reform and democracy in countries. To evaluate this claim requires
attention to two linked questions: Do democratic reforms and freer markets lead
to greater ethnic violence, and if so, how much? If the relationship is positive
but small, we need hardly rethink a major portion of our foreign policy, given
81. A similar story can be told about the Congo, in whose civil war two million people have
died in the past several years. The war has positioned neighboring countries to exploit disruptions
and become major exporters of raw materials. See Musifiky Mwanasali, The View from Below, in
GREED AND GRIEVANCE: ECONOMIC AGENDAS IN CIVIL WARS 137 (Mats Berdal & David M. Malone
eds., 2000).
82. Richard Snyder, Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? States, Regimes, and the Political
Economy of Extraction (Sept. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also Paul
Collier, The Marketfor Civil War, 5/1/03 FOREIGN PoL'Y 3458, 38-41 (noting that economic conditions are "paramount" in explaining civil wars and that the risks rise if an economy is dependent on
natural resource exports).
83. See, e.g., ROBERT KAPLAN, THE COMING ANARCHY (1994); GREED AND GRIEVANCE: ECONOmiC AGENDAS IN CIVIL WARS (Mats Berdal & David M. Malone eds., 2000); Charles King, The
Benefits of Ethnic Wars: UnderstandingEurasia'sUnrecognized States, 53 WORLD POLITICS 524,

524 (2001) ("[Tihe easy labels that analysts use to identify such conflicts-as "ethnic" or "religious"
say-always cloud more than they clarify."); see also BERKELEY, supra note 16, at 36 (describing
how Gio and Krahn tribes fought in Liberia after a coup in 1980, but the same tribes did not fight on
the Ivory Coast side of the border).
84. The rise of the media has in some instances exacerbated ethnic violence. Chua notes that
Amnesty International encouraged press freedom in Rwanda, which empowered a demagogic paper
and contributed to the mobilization of Hutu against Tutsis. See CHUA, supra note 3, at 168-69.
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that democracy may bring positive benefits to countries without market-dominant minorities. The answers to these questions require understanding the
causes of ethnic violence. This is the subject of a massive body of literature,
which could hardly even be summarized here; but it is safe to say that the question is a controversial one.85
a. Relative Status and Ethnic Violence
86
Broadly speaking, there are two streams of writing on ethnic nationalism.
One school, sometimes called the "primordialist," stresses long-standing cultural
differences between groups and sees these as relatively fixed.87 The other,
which is sometimes labeled "instrumentalist," sees ethnicity as socially constructed in response to changing conditions and the manipulation of symbols by
ethnic leaders. 88 Many scholars of this school, sometimes identified as "modernists," see cultural difference as being magnified by economic and social
change associated with modernization. 89 Ethnic groups come into conflict when
they compete over resources, and modernization can exacerbate this competition
for at least two reasons. First, the rise of the modern state, with its control over
resources, creates a new locus for conflict as groups try to capture the state.
Second, expanded economic opportunities provide possibilities for upward social mobility, sometimes leading to new barriers to groups and rising
inequality. 90
This modernist position foreshadows Chua. Just as the rise of the state and
economic growth lead to conflict, democratization and economic liberalization
exacerbate it. What both arguments share is a commitment to the relative gaps
between groups as the primary cause of ethnic conflict.
Ted Gurr, for example, has argued that relative deprivation is a primary
cause of ethnic violence. 9 ' Gurr found the "extent of a communal group's collective disadvantage vis-A-vis other groups is a principle source of its members
grievances and perceptions they have a common interest in collective action." 92
Gurr surveyed 233 communal groups from 1945-1989 and found a strong corre-

85. HoRowrrz, supra note 51, at 39 ("Disappointingly little has come of the prodigious literature on violence.").
86. Brubaker & Laitin, supra note 49.
87. See BEVERLY CRAWFORD, THE MYTH OF "ETHNIC CONFLICT": POLITICs, ECONOMICS, &
CULTURAL VIOLENCE 10-12 (Beverley Crawford & Ronnie D. Lipschutz eds., 1998); Demet Yalcin
Mousseau, Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?, 38 J. PEACE RESEARCH 547,

548-49 (2001); see also David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, supra note 61.
88. GURR, Ethnic Bases for PoliticalAction in the 1980s and 1990s, supra note 62, at 4-5;
RUSSELL HARDIN, ONE FOR ALL: THE LOGIC OF GROUP CONFLICT 160-61 (1995).
89. See Bowen, supra note 47, at 4 (writing that ethnicity is a product of modem politics); see
also Newman, supra note 64, at 455 (quoting Walker Connor, The Politics of Ethnonationalism,27
J. INT'L AF.

1 (1973)).

90. Fearon & Laitin, supra note 69, at 78.
91. TED GURR & BARBARA HART, ETHNIC CONFLICT IN WORLD POLITICS (1994); GURR, Long
War, Short Peace, supra note 61; see also TED ROBERT GURR, WHY MEN REBEL 13 (1969) ("Discontent arising form the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for
participants in collective violence.").
92. GURR, Incentives for Ethnopolitical Conflict: World Patterns of Discrimination and Repression in the 1990s, in PEOPLES VERSUS STATES, supra note 45, at 123.
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lation between "relative ecological and demographic stress" and ethnic grievances. 9 3 It would seem to follow that economic disparity of the type discussed
by Chua would contribute to ethnic tension, and possibly even ethnic violence.
Political scientists and sociologists who study ethnic conflict do not all
agree on this position. Some have argued that relative economic deprivation
alone cannot explain ethnic conflict, since relative deprivation is a universal
characteristic of economies. 94 Walker Connor has pointed out that the fact of
economic disparity is so widespread, that it appears to be involved in every case
of ethnic conflict. Disproportionate economic performance may result from
other features, such as the fact that ethnic groups tend to populate different regions that have different resource endowments. Differential economic performance in such circumstances would not result from ethnic factors, but would
appear concurrently. 95 Again, the distinction between apparent correlation and
causation is important.
Others have tried to square the "primordialist" difference-based position
with the relative deprivation theory. Alexis Herclides notes that the more a
group possesses a common history or can be characterized as a nation, "the more
secondary the role played by the factor of inequality or disadvantage in spurring
active separatism." 9 6 Others have also focused on explicitly political understandings as the primary determinant, rather than economic deprivation. 97 Gurr
himself notes that "the profile of contemporary ethnonationalist movements displays a general lack of congruence between a group's status in society and its
demand for separation." 98 Thus, the degree to which economic imbalances
cause ethnic conflict is not certain, but does not suggest the uniform, unidirectional causal relationship implied in Chua's simple story.
Some suggestive evidence on the role of economic differences can be
found in the experiences of developed countries, though Chua repeatedly asserts
that patterns of ethnic relations in the developing world bear no resemblance to
those in developed countries. During the 1950s and 1960s Flanders and
Slovakia were given large resource transfers to narrow the gaps between them
and other regions. 99 These regions developed rapidly, but this narrowing of the
income gap was accompanied by rising demands for autonomy. Similarly, the
Basque and Catalan regions of Spain have advanced their ethnic separatist
claims while they are becoming even richer relative to the rest of Spain. 1° In
93.

Id.

94. WALKER CONNOR, ETHNONATIONALISM: THE QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING (1993).
95. Note the presence of a chicken/egg problem applying this argument to market dominant
minorities, which tend to concentrate in cities. Cities are centers of economic activity; do the minorities concentrate there because they have an advantage in economic activity, or does the economic
performance of a city depend on who lives there?
96. ALEXIS HERACL1DES, THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITics 19 (1992).
97. DONALD HoRowrrz, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CoNFLIcT 259 (1985).
98. RAY TARAS & RAJAT GANGULAY, UNDERSTANDING ETHNIC CONFLICT 30 (2001).
99. CONNOR, supra note 94, at 10.

100.

Id. at 15.
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short, developed country experiences suggest that relative deprivation may not
be a key factor at all.
b.

Democracy, Development and Ethnic Violence

If the relationship between economic deprivation and ethnic conflict is not
clear, the literature on the relationship between democracy and ethnic conflict
suggests more consensus. A long line of research suggests that political violence, in general, is not associated with either autocracy or democracy, but occurs most often and severely in semi-democracies.' 1 This is the so-called
inverted U-shape relationship, with high levels of violence in the middle and
low levels on either tail. This research implies that democratization from autocracy can lead to greater conflict in the short run, consistent with Chua's thesis.
Indeed, one of Gurr's studies found that in some circumstances democratization
had exacerbated ethnic conflict between 1975-86.102 On the other hand, greater
democratization from a semi-democratic point should lead to less political
violence.
Mousseau recently conducted a large-n study testing the relationship between higher levels of democracy and development on the one hand and political conflict on the other.' 0 3 Mousseau confirms that "nations at middle levels of
democracy and development are more likely to experience higher levels of political violence than nations at low and high levels of democracy and development."' 4 He notes, however, that ethnic heterogeneity has no independent
effect: it is not associated with higher levels of violence within nations except
under certain political conditions.' 0 5 Thus, Mousseau rejects the "primordialist"
thesis that ethnic division is sufficient to cause violence.
Mousseau further notes that ethnic heterogeneity does make a difference
with regard to the effect of high levels of democracy and development in reducing violence. Democratization has a greater pacifying impact in homogenous
nations than in heterogeneous ones. Indeed, for highly heterogeneous semi-democracies, he finds that autocracy does better than democracy in reducing the
chance of political violence.1 0 6 These findings seems intuitive and broadly consistent with Chua's "modernist" thesis, at least for countries starting from low
base levels of democracy and development. Autocracies have greater means to
repress ethnic violence than democracies. Shifting to semi-democracy deprives
leaders of many tools, and can lead to a surge in conflict.
101.

See, e.g., Tanja Ellingsen, Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew? Multiethnicity

and Domestic Conflict During and After the Cold War, 44 J. CoNF. RESOL. 228 (2000). But see
GURR, Incentives for Ethnopolitical Conflict, supra note 92, at 156-57 (noting that transitional regimes have less conflict than autocracies but more than democracies).
102. GURR, MINORITIES AT RISK, supra note 66, at 138. His more recent study finds that democratic transitions are followed by increases in ethnic protest, but not violent rebellion. See GuRu,
Democratic Governments and Strategiesfor Accommodation in PluralisticSocieties, in Peoples Versus States, supra note 45, at 156-57.
103. Mousseau, supra note 87, at 547-67.
104. Id. at 559.
105. Id. ("[E]thnic divisions, alone, do not contribute to extreme political violence.")
106. Id. at 560.

330

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:310

Even if the probability of violence indeed increases with democracy and
development, the magnitude of the effect must be analyzed. We must also be
concerned with the levels of violence, not merely the direction of the causal
relationships. Mousseau notes that highly democratic heterogeneous nations
have a probability of extreme violence of 14%, more than double the rate of
highly democratic homogenous nations. to7 What we do not know is whether
this absolute magnitude is severe or not. Semi-democracies, which have the
highest rate of violence, have a 20-25% probability of extreme violence.' 0 8 The
policy question then becomes whether these levels are of sufficient magnitude to
discourage democratization for heterogeneous nations that are autocratic.
If the relationships among democracy, development and ethnic violence are
complex and non-monotonic, What factors enhance the probability of conflict?
As Chua suggests, a key element is the desire of group leaders and political
entrepreneurs to exploit the situation. Ethnic tension is generally a top-down
phenomenon, not one that emerges from the grassroots. 0 9 Leaders are an independent variable. Leaders may engage in what scholars identify as "ethnic outbidding"; such a problem exists where two or more leaders compete for support
within an ethnic group, within a democratic framework, each seeking to prove it
is more "ethnic" than the other. However, outbidding is really an "exceptional,
not typical, consequence of democratization."' 10
Democracy is not the only source of demagoguery. As Chua acknowledges, Stalin killed many Jews and others in a transformation that can hardly be
The Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, it has been argued,
called democratic.'
targeted certain minorities in the midst of its general auto-genocide." t 2 Idi
Amin targeted Asians in Uganda, ultimately expelling them. None of these regimes was a democracy. The fall of Suharto in Indonesia is alleged to have
exacerbated anti-Chinese feeling, as evidenced by the massacres of 1998 in
Jakarta, but we should not forget the millions killed in 1965, when Suharto rose
to power. Suharto's coup was hardly a democratizing moment.
In sum, the most generous interpretation of the social science literature suggests that in heterogeneous societies, a transition to democracy and markets may
contribute to greater ethnic conflict, especially if they are transitioning from
autocracy. The strength of the effect is unclear. The U-shaped finding suggests
that it may be limited to the short term, if the country continues to democratize
and develop. Granted, Chua recognizes the distinction between short and long
term. She notes that "markets and democracy may well offer the best long-run
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Bowen, supra note 47, at 7 ("[1t is fear and hate generated from the top, and not ethnic
differences, that finally push people to commit acts of violence."); see also BERKELEY, supra note
16, at 35 ("All of Africa's ethnic conflicts start at the top and spread downward.").
110. GURR, Long War, Short Peace, supra note 61, at 43; Brubaker & Laitin, supra note 49, at
434 (noting that in Yugoslavia, elites in election campaigns engaged in underbidding, not to mobilize but to demobilize the population. If the politicians had made explicitly ethnic appeals in a
multiethnic society, they might mobilize a backlash.)
11.
CHUA, supra note 3, at 82.
112.

KIERNAN, supra note 63.
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economic and political hope for developing and post-Communist societies. In
the short run, however, they are part of the problem."' 13 However, if ethnic
violence on the whole is on the decline, the short run may be over.
c.

An Alternative Hypothesis: Political Transition

Another possible interpretation of the surge in conflict in the early 1990s
followed by a decline is that political change, in general, offers windows of
opportunity for action.' 14 Political transition creates uncertainty, and this is true
whether the transition is towards or away from a democratic direction. Uncertainty is a major source of potential ethnic conflict."15 When old social contracts are broken, power shifts and tension results, allowing political
entrepreneurs to exploit anxiety about a change in group relations." 6 In short, it
may be the fact of political transition and change, rather than the direction of
that change, that is the most significant factor.
This political transition hypothesis is consistent with the 1990s pattern of
an early surge in violence followed by a decline in conflict. Gurr notes that the
decline in ethnic conflict resulted in part because the breakup of states had
largely passed.'17 The closing of the Cold War led to the emergence of many
boundanew states, the political borders of which hardly corresponded to ethnic
8
ries. The result was great opportunities for ethnic demagoguery."
A focus on political transition per se also helps us understand why instances of ethnically-oriented violence also occurred in the period before the
widespread export of democracy and markets. Idi Amin's regime in Uganda
and Stalin's in the Soviet Union are two of many examples. Demagogues exploit political opportunities in periods of rapid change. The opportunities for
demagoguery may lie less in the character of democracy than in the nature of
transition.
III.
SOLUTIONS?

Chua's primary purpose is to call attention to an important phenomenon in
an interesting way, and in this effort she succeeds. The normative section of the
book is very brief, which is perhaps appropriate given the difficulty of solving
113. CHIJA, supra note 3, at 13. Fearon and Laitin's finding that poverty is associated with civil
war suggests that there is an absolute good in development. See Fearon & Laitin, supra note 69.
114. See Barry Posen, The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict, 35 SURVIVAL 27 (1993);
Brubaker & Laitin, supra note 49, at 437.
115. Lake and Rothchild, for example, find that collective fear of the future is the major cause
of ethnic conflict. See David A. Lake & Donald Rothchild, Containing Fear: The Origins and
Management of Ethnic Conflict, 21 INT'L SEC. 41 (1996). In 1971, Samuel Huntington noted, "Civil
violence is more characteristic of societies in the middle of the process of modernization than it is of
societies which are either highly modern or highly traditional." Samuel Huntington, Civil Violence
and the Process of Development, 83 ADELPHI PAPERS 1, 2 (1971).
116. CRAWFORD, supranote 88, at 5; see also HORowrrz, DEADLY ETHNIC RIOT, supra note 51,

at 565.
117.
118.

GURR, Preface, supra note 67, at xiv.
Id.

332

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:3 10

the problem she lays out, and the potential perverse effects that might result
from such efforts. 1 9 This section considers Chua's recommendations as well as
other possible solutions she does not suggest. Her recommendations fall into
three categories: those directed at the market-dominant minorities, those directed
at leaders in the developing world, and those directed at the international
community.
The recommendations directed at minorities are unobjectionable. Chua
calls on them to engage in more philanthropy, especially that directed at the
broader society, rather than the narrow needs of the ethnic group. If this were an
efficacious solution, one wonders why many market-dominant minorities have
not independently pursued such an option. One possibility is that, in contexts
where private philanthropy is not well-developed, members of the targeted market-dominant minority might fear that public philanthropy could serve as a public signal of their wealth, and hence heighten awareness of their marketdominance.
For leaders in the developing world, the obvious implication is to promote
redistributive policies (progressive taxation and promotion of a welfare state),
such as those that have worked in places like Malaysia as well as in Western
societies. Chua is correct in arguing that the simultaneous transition to democracy and markets is unlike the manner in which these institutions developed in
the West, and needs to be carefully managed. Redistribution might be a mechanism that reduces tension.
The larger normative questions are directed to the international community.
If the causal relationships among democracy, development and ethnic violence
were as strong Chua's title suggests, the obvious normative implication would
be to stop the simultaneous export of democracy and markets. Chua is clear that
she is not calling for an end to democratization or economic liberalization, but
limits her major normative recommendation to "understanding."' 20 Nevertheless, if she is right, the development community should consider whether reforms ought to be sequenced, with democracy preceding markets (or vice versa).
I have suggested in this review that Chua is not right, or at least has not
established her claims sufficiently to adjust policy. The causal relationships involved are complex, and the effect of democracy on violence is not so strong as
to produce clear normative conclusions. We cannot be sure that the net global
result of democracy and markets is indeed worse. It may be that if we were to
adopt a different set of global policies (promoting single party states and closed
economies) conflict over resources would be worse, not better. We are unable
to draw either conclusion based on Chua's anecdotal data.
If Chua is right, and ethnic harmony, democracy and markets cannot all coexist, how might we choose among the right course to take? Mousseau's inverted U-shaped finding, namely that violence is associated with mid-levels of
democracy and development, provides a framework to answer the question.121
119.
120.
121.

See Davis et al., supra note 10, at 353-55.
CHUA, supra note 3, at 16.
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Assuming arguendo, that ethnic conflict is the supreme evil that we seek to
minimize, we can do so in one of two ways: by returning to dictatorship and
poverty or by increasing democracy and development. There seems no moral
reason to prefer the former solution.
Chua's actual normative suggestions to the international community are
minimal. She makes a brief suggestion that minority rights and constitutionalism ought to be given greater weight.12 2 If Chua is suggesting that the various
actors involved in promoting democracy abroad have been promoting a merely
123
proceduralist, electoral model without constitutionalism, she is simply wrong.
Indeed, a major component of the recent wave of law and development is precisely the kind of institution that can protect rights, promote justice and develop
constitutionalism. For most of the 1990s, "democracy programs" explicitly
adopted a substantive component or else were closely linked with rule of law
programs that sought to ameliorate the dangers of too much democracy.
Whether or not these efforts have been effective is a different story, of
course. 12 4 One can question the competence and good faith of the rule of law
promoters, one can and ought to critically examine the effectiveness of these
programs, but one cannot seriously question that these are programs actually
being implemented.
More surprisingly, Chua devotes no attention to specific institutional designs that might ameliorate ethnic tension. Political institutions provide a framework within which elites can manage conflict or promote it, depending on their
inclination. Constitutional design and political institutions are thus important
variables that can exacerbate or ameliorate ethnic tension.1 25 For example,
Saideman and his co-authors found that although democracies are more likely to
experience ethnic conflict, institutions matter.1 26 Proportional representation
systems, by allowing a range of views to be expressed, have much less ethnic
protest and ethnic conflict than presidential systems, which have a winner-takeall character.12 7 Federalism can increase ethnic protest, depending on the lines
drawn, but can also reduce the level of ethnic violence, perhaps because it allows for local autonomy for particular groups.' 28 A good example is the experience of Nigeria after the 1967 redrawing of federal boundaries into multiethnic
states, following the Biafran war.' 2 9 Of course, no institutional design is perfect
and there is no way to eliminate ethnic conflict entirely, but choices can make a
difference. 13
122. Id. at 259.
123. CAROTHERS, supra note 24.
124. See Garth, Building Strong and Independent JudiciariesThrough New Law and Development, supra note 1.
125. HoRowrrz, supra note 97; see also DONALD HoRowrrz, A CONSTrrTiON FOR SOUTH AFRICA (1991); Ghai, supra note 47.
126. Saideman, supra note 67, at 119.
127. See Frank S. Cohen, Proportional Versus MajoritarianEthnic Conflict Management in
Democracies, 30 CoMP. POL. STUD. 607, 609-14 (1997); Lake & Rothchild, supra note 115, at 6061.
128. Saideman, supra note 67, at 120; Lake & Rothchild, supra note 115.
129. Bowen, supra note 47, at 11-12.
130. Lake & Rothschild, supra note 116, at 42.
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Chua also does not consider steps that the international community can take
to minimize the risks of backlashes. One important finding on the decline of
ethnic violence in the second half of the 1990s is that the capacities of both
democratic governments and the international community in combating ethnic
violence have actually increased. 13 1 For the international community, the embarrassments of Rwanda, which took place while the West stood idly by, have
132
led it to seek to use mechanisms that will help nip ethnic conflict in the bud.
Each incident of ethnic conflict is not isolated.
One other strategy for the international community is to target systems of
finance and supply that feed ethnic conflict. In many instances, ethnic conflict
is exacerbated by the presence of external markets for natural resources like
diamonds. In addition, diaspora communities in rich countries can provide financing that perpetuates conflict. 133 Stemming the flow of funds to ethnic demagogues can reduce the incentives to engage in ethnic violence.
Another example of effective international intervention is the role of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in preventing ethnic violence in Eastern Europe. The OSCE, an organization of virtually all of
Europe's governments, set up the High Commissioner on National Minorities in
1992 in reaction to the ethnic conflict in the Balkans and charged the office with
serving as an "instrument of conflict prevention at the earliest possible
stage."' 13 4 The Commissioner has taken a proactive role in going to potential
hot spots and negotiating instruments at the highest political levels to ensure
minority protections. Even though these instruments are not legally binding in a
formal sense, Ratner suggests they have been extraordinarily effective in securing minority protections and preventing conflict. In helping make norms effective, the High Commissioner has sometimes mobilized international support for
the solutions he has offered, for example by pressuring members of the ethnic
minority in a neighboring state to support the agreement.' 3 5 In other instances,
he has mobilized international funding to make complying with commitments
easier. The point is that there are quite specific institutional approaches to ameliorating ethnic conflict that would benefit from normative analysis. But this
would draw attention away from the image of the world as an ethnic cauldron.
Perhaps the greatest normative impact Chua's book can have is to call attention to the general importance of distribution in development programs. The
early 1990s enthusiasm for radical free-market reforms assumed that putting
wealth into private hands would alone provide the basis for growth. This assumption ignored all questions of distribution, with the result that market democracy is perceived as illegitimate in much of the world. The backlash from
maldistribution that Chua highlights can occur regardless of ethnic divisions,
131. GURR, Preface, supra note 67.
132. Id. at xiv; see also Susan Olzak & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Status in the World System and Ethnic
Mobilization, 42:6 J. CONF. RESOL. 691 (1998).
133. Collier, supra note 82, at 83.
134. Steven Ratner, Does InternationalLaw Matter In Preventing Ethnic Conflict?, 32 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 591, 606 (2000).
135. Id. at 638-41.
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and promoters of free markets would do well to remember the importance of
taking politics into account.
CONCLUSION

Chua's book is a stimulating tour of the last decade's ethnic conflicts that
will appeal to many. As a book of academic politics, she satisfies many constituencies. Some free-market ideologues may seize on the book to argue that eco36
nomic liberalization requires authoritarian rule, and argue against democracy. 1
Progressives may focus on the need for democratization and redistribution, without economic liberalization. Critical race scholars will focus on the apparent
ubiquity of racial and ethnic conflict.
But the wide appeal of Chua's argument does not mean that she is correct.
When one looks at the trees rather than the forest, many of the phenomena tied
together by her theory do not in fact belong there. Most prominently, there has
been a decline in global ethnic conflict since the mid-1990s. Even for those
conflicts that have occurred, the relationship among democracy, development
and conflict is not as straightforward as she suggests. Policymakers must understand ethnic dynamics, but should also not let the need for "understanding" lead
them to disengage from democracy around the globe.
Chua's work fits squarely in two growing trends. First, it is part of a recent
shift in those writing on globalization, both within and outside the economics
profession. 137 These writers are beginning to question the particular forms of
globalization launched by international financial institutions. This is a leftward
shift in the classical sense: whereas optimists see democracy, development and
law working in mutually supportive ways, the recent stream of writings resonate
13 8
with the classical Marxist view that conflict is endemic to social change.
Such critical views are of crucial importance given the obvious failures of
globalization to legitimate itself in the eyes of the world.
The second trend is that of the strong turn toward social science in legal
scholarship. Lawyers are increasingly drawing on social science tools to inform
normative arguments about the design of legal institutions and to conduct positive research.139 Chua does not offer any magic normative solutions, which is
perhaps admirable. As a positive research project, however, her study poses a
social science question but fails to use the appropriate techniques of social science to answer it. The book lacks the methodological rigor that must ultimately
support any compelling conclusion about the complex relationships between democracy, development and ethnicity.

136. Chua rejects this position. CHUA, supra note 3, at 262-63.
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